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Jewett v. Commissioner:

Unforeseen Crisis of Disclaimers
INTRODUCTION

A donee's refusal to accept ownership of property constitutes an
indirect gift to a successor in interest subject to federal gift tax
liability.' However, under section 25.2511-1(c) of the Treasury
Regulations, such a refusal is not subject to tax if it is effective
under local law and made "within a reasonable time after knowl'2
edge of the existence of the transfer.
The regulation does not specify what tolls this "reasonable time"
requirement. 3 Until recently, virtually all courts tolled the reasonable time for section 25.2511-1(c) purposes when the transfer of
control of the property to the beneficiary occurred. 4 In Jewett v.
Commissioner,5 however, the Supreme Court held that the reasonable time requirement tolled at the creation of the original interest,
whether the interest was contingent or vested, and notwithstanding
when control of the property actually passed to the beneficiary.
This article will discuss the Court's decision in Jewett v.
Commissioner.The concept of the common law disclaimer and its
statutory development will be summarized. The legislative and
judicial history of section 25.2511-1(c) will be examined, and Jewett

1. I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2511 (1976). The federal government has very broad authority to tax.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In exercise of this authority, Congress created the Estate and
Gift Tax scheme, joined together as subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally
Harris, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531 (1940). An estate tax is
imposed upon transfers of property at death. Treas. Reg. § 20.0-1 (1958). A gift tax is imposed
upon lifetime transfers of property for less than adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1976). Both taxes are assessed upon the privilege of
transferring the property. For an overview of the estate and gift tax scheme, see generally C.
LOWNDES & . KRAMER, FEDERAL FSTATE AND GFT TAXES (1962).
2. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). In 1976, Congress added § 2518 to the Internal
Revenue Code, which specifies the time limitation within which a beneficiary may disclaim
for all transfers made after December 31, 1976. See H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 3356,3422. For a more detailed explanation of § 2518, see infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
3. See Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57,61 (8th Cir. 1973).
4. See generally M. Wenig, Recent Developments in Estate and Gift Taxes: Disclaimer
-the ProposedRegulations, 15 REAL PROP. PROB. & Tn. J. 743 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Wenig].
5. 102 S. Ct. 1082 (1982).
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will be analyzed in light of this background. Specifically, this
article will focus on those factors which should have weighed more
heavily with the Court: the estate and gift tax scheme, the intent of
the drafters of the regulation, the significance of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, and the policy reasons for encouraging consistency in
6
the estate and gift tax laws.
BACKGROUND

Section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code7 states the general
rule that a tax will be imposed on the transfer of property by gift.
The expansive scope of the term "transfer" is set forth in section
2511,8 which provides that ".... the tax imposed by section 2501
shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether
the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or
personal, tangible or intangible .... -9 The terms are to be construed
in "the broadest and most comprehensive sense" 10 to include "all
property, however conceptual or contingent.""
In 1958, the Internal Revenue Commission promulgated interpretive regulations which include some exceptions to the general
tax rule. Among these is section 25.2511-1(c) of the Treasury
Regulations 12 which provides that validly executed disclaimers
6.

This discussion will focus only on that part of the Jewett opinion dealing specifically

with Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c). The Court also addresses and dismisses a "retroactivity"
argument and an argument analogizing the special power of appointment to disclaimers.
Id. at 1090. Because these arguments do not address the proper interpretation of the treasury regulation, they are beyond the scope of this article.
7. I.R.C. § 2501 (1976).
8. I.R.C. § 2511 (1976). The current statute was enacted in 1954 and amended in 1976.
This enactment was by no means the first federal attempt to address taxation of property
transfers. As early as 1924, the Revenue Act of 1924 imposed a tax on the transfer by gift "of
any property, whether made directly or indirectly." Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319,320,
43 Stat. 253, 313 (1976).
9. I.R.C.§ 2511(a) (1976).
10. S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39(1932); H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
27 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 524; 1939-1 C.B. 457, 476.
11. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176,180 (1943). The Court here interpreted I.R.C. §§
1000(b), 1030(b) (1939), which language is substantially the same as that adopted in the 1954
Code.
12. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(1958) provides:
The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions whereby
property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or conferred upon
another, regardless of the means or device employed, constitute gifts subject to
tax. Where the law governing the administration of the decedent's estate gives a
beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to
accept ownership of property transferred from a decedent (whether the transfer is
effected by the decedent's will or by the law of descent and distribution of intestate
property), a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the making of a gift if
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are exempt from the gift tax. 13 In order to understand the essence
of this regulation and its place in the tax scheme, it is helpful to
understand the regulation's history.
Disclaimer Priorto Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-1(c)
According to basic property law, a transfer is not complete until
it is accepted by the recipient, and, in general, no person can be
forced to accept property against his will. 14 Thus, a beneficiary of
a trust or will can renounce his gift, provided both that he has not
the refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of
the transfer. The refusal must be unequivocable [sic] and effective under the local
law. There can be no refusal of ownership of property after its acceptance. Where
the local law does not permit such a refusal, any disposition by the beneficiary,
heir, or next-of-kin whereby ownership is transferred gratuitously to another constitutes the making of a gift by the beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin. In any case
where a refusal is purported to relate to only a part of the property the determination of whether or not there has been a complete and unqualified refusal to accept
ownership will depend on all of the facts and circumstances in each particular
case, taking into account the recognition and effectiveness of such a purported
refusal under the local law. In the absence of facts to the contrary, if a person fails
to refuse to accept a transfer to him of ownership of a decedent's property within a
reasonable time after learning of the existence of the transfer, he will be presumed
to have accepted the property.
13. Disclaimers per se were recognized by the 1939 Code, through a 1942 amendment. 26
U.S.C. § 811(f)(2) (1939), reenacted as I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (1954).
14. See, e.g., Estate of Hoenig v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 471, 477 (1976); People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 211, 162 N.E. 848, 850 (1928); Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 558, 164 P.
1100, 1101 (1917); Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793,797,32 S.E.2d 588,591 (1945). See generally
Newman & Kalter, Need for DisclaimerLegislation-anAnalysis of Background and Cur-rent Law, 28 TAX LAW. 571 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Newman & Kalter]; Note, When is
Gift in Trust Completed, 10 ARK. L. REv. 234 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Note, Gift in Trust];
Note, Disclaimersin Federal Taxation, 63 HARV. L REV. 1047, 1050 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Disclaimerstn Federal Taxation]. See also G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRuSTS § 36 (4th ed.
1963); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1141 (1948).
Many courts and commentators have held that the right to refuse to accept property is an
unqualified right, provided that the disclaimant has complied with local law. See, e.g.,
Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1980); Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63, 67 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Estate of Rolin v.

Commissioner, 68 T.C. 919, 925 (1977), aff'd, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,271 (1977);
Estate of Dreyer v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 275, 294 (1977); Estate of Hoenig v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 471 477 (1976); Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Mo. 1943); Perkins v.
Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 798, 32 S.E.2d 588,591 (1945) and cases cited therein. See also Erbacher,

Federal Estate Tax: Minimization by Renunciationof Bequest or Devise, 40 U.M.K.C.L.
REv. 170, 178 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Erbacher]; Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation,46 U. Cm. L. REy. 316, 316 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Martin]; Smith,
Propertyand Tax Consequences of Renunciationsand Disclaimers,96 T. & EST. 744, 744

(1957) [hereinafter cited as Smith]; Note, Availability of Renunciations for Post-Mortem
Estate Planning in New York State, 34 ALB. L. REV. 642, 643 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Planning in New York]. See generally 6 PAGE LAW OF WIUS § 49.8 (Bowe-Parker ed.
1962); 34A AM. Jua 2D Federal Taxation 47,325-47,339.
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already accepted it 15 and that the rights of third parties are not
involved. 16 Refusal to accept a gift constitutes the common law
concept of disclaimer.' 7 In addition, if a beneficiary chooses to
disclaim, he must do so through affirmative action in order to
rebut the presumption of acceptance which generally attaches to
gifts. 18
Thus, under the common law, an effectively disclaimed gift is
void with regard to the disclaiming beneficiary. The property
passes as though the renouncing beneficiary had predeceased the
donor. The result is that the property passes to whomever the

15. Estate of Rolin v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 919, 926 (1977), aff'd, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 13,271 (1978); Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147, 153 (1961); People v. Flanagin,
331 Ill. 203, 211,162 N.E. 848, 849 (1928); Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 798, 32 S.E.2d 588,
591 (1945) and cases cited therein. See also Smith, supra note 13, at 744; I A. ScoTT ON
TRusTs § 36.1 (1967 ed.); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1151 n. 27 (1948) and cases cited therein.
16. Estate of Dreyer v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 275, 293 (1977); In re Kalt's Estate, 16 C.2d
807, 810, 18 P.2d 401,404 (1940); In re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398,404,83 N.E.2d 852, 855
(1949); In re Behn's Estate, 201 Misc. 12, 106 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (Civ. Ct. 1951). See also
Smith, supra note 14, at 744.
Absent collusion or fraud, the motive for the disclaimer has no bearing on its validity if
the disclaimer is otherwise effective under local law. See Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d
1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 1980); Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57,66 (8th Cir. 1973); Estate of
Dreyer v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 275,294 (1977); Estate of Hoenig v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.
471,477 (1976); Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556,560, 164 P. 1100, 1101 (1917); Seifner v. Weller,
171 S.W.2d 617,623 (Mo. 1943); Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 798,32 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1945).
See also 34A AM. JuI, 2D FederalTaxation 47,325 (1982); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1151 n.29 (1948)
and cases cited therein. See generallyBerall, Using DisclaimersEffectively: An Analysis of
a Useful Post-Mortem Tax Planning Tool, 34 J. TAX'N 92 (1971)[hereinafter cited as Berall];
Smith, supra note 13, at 744.
17. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914,917(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933); In re
Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal.2d 807, 810, 108 P.2d 401, 404 (1940). See also T. ATKINSON LAW OF
WILLS § 139 (2d ed. 1953); 6 PAGE, supranote 14, § 49.2. For an excellent article on tax aspects
of disclaimer, see Report, Post Mortem Estate Planning,4 REAL PROP. PROB. & Tit J. 209
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Report]. For articles on disclaimers and their tax treatment, see
generally Berall, supra note 16; Donovan & Reid, Disclaimingan Interest in Property Can
Save Income as Well as Transfer Taxes, 9 TAX'N FOR LAw. 278 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Donovan & Reid]; Haddad, Disclaimer:Still Many UnresolvedIssues After Passageof New
Federaland Illinois Statutes, 1979 ILL B.J. 673 [hereinafter cited as Haddad]; Holzman, The
Nature of Taxable Gifts, 43 TAXES 189 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Holzman]; Lowndes,
Common Sense Correlationof the Estate and Gift Taxes, 17 U. FLA. L REv. 507 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Common Sense Correlation]; Lowndes, Tax Planningfor Estates
Underthe New Estate and Gift Tax Regulations, 1959 DUKE LJ. 182; Martin, supra note 14;
Newman & Kalter, supra note 14; Smith, supranote 14; Wenig, supra note 4; Note, Planning
in New York, supra note 14; Note, Gift and Trust, supra note 14; Note, Disclaimers as a
Postmortem EstatePlanningDevice, 37 U. CIN. L REv. 567 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Estate PlanningDevice]; Note, Disclaimersin Federal Taxation, supra note 13.
18. Fuller v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147, 153 (1961); People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 207,
162 N.E. 848,850 (1928); Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556,561,164 P. 1100, 1101 (1917); Mackey
v. Bowen, 332 Mas. 167, 170, 124 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1955); Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617,
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donor named to succeed the renouncing beneficiary. 19 As are most
property rights, however, disclaimers are now creatures of legislative grace. State law governs both the procedural requirements
for disclaimers 20 and the passage of property after an effective
2
disclaimer has been made. '
The seminal tax case on the doctrine of disclaimers, Brown v.
Routzahn,22 was decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1933. In Brown,

622 (Mo. 1943); In re Estate of Wilson, 298 N.Y. 398, 403, 83 N.E.2d 852, 854 (1949). See
generally Berall, supra note 16; Newman and Kalter, Disclaimersof FutureInterests: Continuing Problemsand Suggested Solutions, 49 NoTRE DAME LAW. 827 (1973-74) [hereinafter
cited as N&K]; Smith, supra note, Planningin New York, supra note 14.
19. See, e.g., In re Estate of Devlin, 46 Misc. 2d 399, 259 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (1964). See
generally Martin, supra note 14; Newman & Kalter, supra note 14; Report, supra note 17;
Note, Planningin New York, supra note 14; Note, Estate PlanningDevice, supra note 17.
20. See Berall, supra note 16, at 97. At least 46 states and the District of Columbia have
enacted statutes relative to effective execution of a disclaimer. See ALA. CODE §§ 35-17-2 to
35-17-4 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.295 (1972); 6 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2801 (1975);
ARK. STAT. ANN § 62-3202 (Supp. 1981); CAL PROB. CODE § 190.3(a) (West Supp. 1982); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-1-901 to 15-1-902 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-300 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-113 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.801 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-824(b) (1975);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 560.2-801 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-801 (1979); ILL REV. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, 2-7, ch. 30,
211-213 (1981); IND. CODE § 29-16-4(b) (1976); IOWA CODE § 633.704
(Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2292 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 394.620 (Supp. 1980); LA. REV.
SAT. ANN. §§ 9:1981 to 9:1990 (West 1965); ME. REv. SAT. ANN. tit 18A, § 2-801 (1964); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 9-201 to 9-203 (Supp. 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191A, § 3
(West Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554-511 to 554-512 (Supp. 1982); MINN. SAT. §
525.212 (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-25 (1972); Mo. ANN. SAT. § 474.490 (Vernon 1956);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-101 (1981); NEB. REV. SAT. § 30.2352 (1979), NEV. REV. SAT. §§
120.020, 120.030 (1979); N.J. SAT. ANN. §§ 3A25-40 to 3A.25-44 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. SAT.
ANN. § 45-2-801 (1978); N.Y. Esr. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 2-1.11 (Consol. 1981); N.C. GEN.
SAT. § 31B-2 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.60
(Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 84, §§ 22-30 (West Supp. 1981); O1R REV. SAT. §§ 112.652
(1981); 20 PA. CONS. SAT. ANN. § 6201 (Purdon Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. lAws §§ 34-5-1 to 34-5-12
(1970); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-4-29 to 43-4-30 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-103
(Supp. 1981); TEx PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-801 (Supp.
1981); VA. CODE § 64.1-189 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.86.030 (Supp. 1982); W. VA.
CODE §§ 42-6-1 to 42-6-2 (1982); WIs. SAT. §§ 852.13, 853.21 (1971); WYo. SAT. §§ 2-1-401 to
2-1-403 (1977).
South Carolina recognizes renunciation of dower rights. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-110 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
In the three other states, the common law disclaimer has been judicially recognized. See,
e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 315 A.2d 625, 629 (DeL Ch. 1974); Coleman v.
Burns, 103 N.H. 313, 316, 171 A.2d 33, 35 (1961); Crossman v. Crossman's Estate, 100 Vt.
407, 412, 138 A. 730, 732 (1927).
21. Basic property law states that passage of property is virtually always governed by
state law. See, e.g., Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509,512 (1960); Estate of Williams v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 400, 407 (1974). See also Erbacher, supra note 14, at 174; Kay,
Renunciations, Disclaimers and Releases, 35 TAXEs 767, 767 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Kay]; Martin, supra note 14, at 319; Note, Gift in Trust, supra note 14, at 235.
22. 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
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the decedent refused to accept a bequest under his wife's will. His
disclaimer was filed eight years after his wife's death, but several
weeks before the final distribution of his wife's estate. Decedent
died shortly after he disclaimed. 23
The court held that this disclaimer did not constitute a transfer
in contemplation of death for purposes of the federal estate

tax. 24 The court specifically noted that taxing statutes, such as the

federal estate tax, deal with command over property, not title.25
Although decedent was co-executor of his wife's estate, he never
exercised control over the property as donee. He thus retained the
right to reject the property 26 and prevent completion of the gift.
According to applicable Ohio law, a disclaimer could be validly
effected any time prior to final distribution. 27 Thus, decedent's disclaimer was valid and timely under state law. For tax purposes,
the disclaimer was ruled a refusal to accept a gift of property rather
than a transfer of an interest in property. 28 The Sixth Circuit
determined that the federal tax on transfers is levied on the
transfer of control of property, not on the exercise of a right to
renounce a testamentary gift.29
In 1952, the Eighth Circuit decided Brown's logical corollary in
Hardenbergh v. Commissioner.30 In Hardenbergh,decedent had

23. 63 F.2d at 915.
24. Id. at 917. Thus, the disclaimer was not taxable. Had the court found the contrary,
i.e., that the disclaimer did constitute a transfer in contemplation of death, the disclaimer
would have been subject to tax under I.RC. § 402(c) (1921).
25. 63 F.2d at 917. This prevailing view frequently has been espoused. See Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283
(1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278
U.S. 327, 336 (1929); Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260, 269 (1928); Commissioner v.
Estate of Vease, 314 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir. 1963). The estate tax and the gift tax appear in the
same title, and their provisions have been construed similarly. See Estate of Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39,42 (1939); Halbach v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 141, 147 (1978).
26. The decedent retained control as co-executor, not as donee. Had he died between 1912
(the year of his wife's death) and 1920 (the year of distribution), the property would have
passed as part of his estate because of the presumption of acceptance. See supra text
accompanying note 18. However, because decedent had exercised his disclaimer, the presumption fell.
27. 63 F.2d at 916. At that time, Ohio had no time limit for rejection, as long as rejection
was effective prior to distribution. Ohio's statute now requires a disclaimer to be made, if at
all, within nine months of the later of the effective date of the donative instrument (if the
taker and his interest are both ascertainable at that date) and the date of the occurrence
which renders the taker and his interest to be finally ascertainable. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1339.60(D) (Page 1979).
28. 63 F.2d at 917.
29. Id.
30. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).

19821

Jewett v. Commissioner

drafted a will, but died before it was properly executed. After his
death the taxpayers, decedent's wife and daughters, attempted to
renounce their shares of his estate in order to effect the intent of
decedent as evidenced by the will.3 1 The court noted that under
local law, the decedent's will was invalid. The property therefore
passed by intestacy, vesting immediately at the death of the
intestate in his heirs. The taxpayers' disclaimers thus were rendered
ineffective under local law. The court held that their renunciation
was a gratuitous transfer from the taxpayers to the non-disclaiming
heir 32 and a gift for tax purposes. 3 3 Citing with approval the rule
of Brown in the context of testate renunciation, 34 the court stated
this corollary as the extension of the rule to intestate succession.
Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-1(c)
Cognizant of the common use of disclaimers and the adverse
impact of the tax laws on disclaimants, the drafters of the Treasury Regulations specifically excepted certain disclaimers from gift
taxation. 3 5 The exception, embodied in section 25.2511-1(c), states
in pertinent part: "[a] refusal to accept ownership [of property] does
not constitute the making of a gift if the refusal is made within a
reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer.
The refusal must be unequivocable and effective under local
law."3 6 This regulation was made retroactive and applied to gifts
7
made after December 31, 1954.3
The "reasonable time" requirement of section 25.2511-1(c) is not
defined in the Code or in the regulations. 3 8 Consonant with the
rule set out in Brown, taxpayers and estate planners assumed that
31. According to the terms of the will, the decedent's son would take the entire estate. 198
F.2d at 65.
32. Id. at 67.

33.

Id.

34. Id. at 66.
35. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). Absent this exception, the general rule that all
gratuitous transfers of property are taxable would apply. See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2511 (1976).
36. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). For the full text of the regulation, see supra note 12.
37. 23 Fed. Reg. 8904 (1958).
38. See Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57,61(8th Cir. 1973). Until Congress passed
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the federal timeliness requirement was considered to be a
"reasonable time under all the circumstances." See infra-text accompanying notes 46-49,
132-43. See, e.g., Estate of Rolin v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 919, 927 (1977), affd,79-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,271 (1978); Estate of Dreyer v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 275, 293 (1977);
Estate of Hoenig v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 471,477 (1976); Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617,
623 (Mo. 1943); Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255,263,147 S.W.2d 424, 428 (1940); Coleman v.
Burns, 103 N.H. 313,316, 171 A.2d 33,35 (1961); Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793,798,32 S.E.2d
588, 591 (1945). See also Report, supra note 17, at 209.
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the reasonable time was determined by local law. 39 In 1973, the

Eighth Circuit adopted that prevailing view in Keinath v. Com40
missioner.
In Keinath, the taxpayer's father died testate in 1944, leaving
his entire estate in trust. According to the provisions of the trust,
the trust income was to go to his widow for life, with a vested
remainder subject to divestiture to his two sons. If either son
predeceased the widow, that son's share was to go to his children,
per stirpes.41 In March, 1963, the taxpayer's mother (the life
tenant) died. The taxpayer disclaimed his interest in the trust in
May, 1963,42 two months after his interest fully vested.

The Internal Revenue Commissioner assessed a $669,797.63
deficiency against the taxpayer in 1969, claiming that petitioner
failed to meet the "reasonable time" requirement of section
25.2511-1(c) because the nineteen years from 1944 (the creation of
the trust) to 1963 (the taxpayer's disclaimer) was manifestly
unreasonable. The Tax Court agreed. 43 The Eighth Circuit reversed, however, holding that an unequivocable disclaimer of a
vested remainder subject to divestiture, filed within six months of
the death of the life tenant, was made within a "reasonable

39. Note, however, that in Jewett v. Commissioner, 102 S. Ct. 1082 (1982), the Supreme
Court stated that since local law often has its own timeliness requirement relative to disclaimer, the "timeliness requirement" contained in Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) would be superfluous. Id. at 1089. The Court refuted its own argument, however, at footnote 17 where it

noted that the federal timeliness requirement may have been added to guard against local
statutes without timeliness requirements such as that in Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933). Such an analysis suggests that the validity of the
disclaimer initially rests on local law, but that an additional federal reasonable time
requirement might well shorten the amount of time allowable.
In Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1944), the Court did point out that the
states' concerns over determining disclaimer requirements are different from those of the
federal government. The states are concerned with passage of property, Estate of Halbach
v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 141, 145 (1978), the federal government with revenue, Tyler v.
United States, 281 U.S. 497,503 (1930). See generally Note, Disclaimersin FederalTaxation,
supra note 14.

40. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 59. Per stirpes means the taking from decedent by right of representation. For
example, "A" dies, leaving all of his property to his children per stirpes. If "A" died, leaving
two living children and two grandchildren from one dead child, the two living children each
take one third of the estate. The two grandchildren split their dead parent's share equally, so
each gets one-half of one-third, or one-sixth. T. ATKiNSON, supra note 17, § 16.
Another method of distribution is "percapita," which means "equally." Thus in the above
example, each of the four survivors would take one fourth of decedent's estate. See 4 PAGE,
supra note 14, § 36.6.

42. 480 F.2d at 59.
43. 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
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time."4 4 This position was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit in
5
1980.1
Recent DisclaimerDevelopments
In 1976, Congress added a new section to the Internal Revenue
Code 46 which specified the elements of a valid disclaimer for federal tax purposes. 4 7 Most important for this discussion, the new
section defined the reasonable time requirement, stating, inter alia,
that a disclaimer must be filed with the statutorily designated tax
official no later than nine months after the day the transfer creating the interest in such person was made or on which such person
attained age twenty-one, whichever occurs first.48 This statute
was made prospective only, to "apply with respect to transfers
creating an interest in the person disclaiming made after Decem49
ber 31, 1976."
JEWETT V. COMMISSIONER

In 1980, the Ninth Circuit held in Jewett v. Commissioner5° that
the federal timeliness requirements are separate from and in addi44. 480 F.2d at 64. The court said that remainder interests which are not subject to
divestiture should be disclaimed within a reasonable time after the testator's death. Where a
remainder interest is subject to divestiture, however, the reasonable time is measured from
the death of the life tenant. Id. at 64. For a critique of this position, see N&K, supra note 18,
at 840-43; Note, Federal Gift Tax - § 2511 - Taxation of Vested Remainders,51 TEx. L REV.
1430, 1433 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Gift Tax].
45. Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir, 1980). See generally Note, Unequivocable Disclaimers: Determining A Reasonable Time to Disclaim, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv.
1229 (1981).
46. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009(e)(2), 90 Stat. 1893 (1976) (codified
at I.R.C. § 2518 (1976)).
47. There are four requirements: 1) the disclaimer must be written; 2) it must meet
specific timeliness requirements; 3) the disclaimant must not have previously accepted such
interest or any of its benefits; and 4) as a result of the refusal, the interest must pass to
someone other than the disclaimant. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (1976).
48. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1976). Note that this section provides a maximum but no
minimum period within which to disclaim. Thus, if state law requires that disclaimers must
occur earlier than the nine month period granted by § 2518, the federal period will be
lessened as well, since one federal requirement is that the disclaimer must be effective under
local law. See Frimmer, ProposedRegs. Under Section 2518 Explain and Expand the Federal DisclaimerStatute, 53 J. TAX'N., 266, 267 (1980).
49. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No: 94-455, § 2009(eX2), 90 Stat. 1893 (1976). See also
H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3356, 3422. The House Ways and Means Committee recognized explicitly in its report that
"in the case of transfers made before January 1, 1977, the rules relating to disclaimers under
present law, including the period within which a disclaimer must be made, are to continue to
apply to disclaimers made after December 31, 1976." Id.
50. 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980), affg, 70 T.C. 430 (1978).
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tion to the timeliness requirement of local law for purposes of section 25.2511-1(c). 51 In addition, the court stated that the "reasonable time" tolls at the creation of the interest, not after the interest
indefeasibly vests. 52 This decision created a conflict between the
circuits, 53 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jewett on

June 1, 1981.51
The Facts
Margaret Jewett, the testatrix, died testate on January 14, 1939.
Her will created a trust for the benefit of her husband during his
lifetime, and thereafter, for the benefit of her son and daughter-inlaw (petitioner's parents) during their lifetimes. At the death of the
last surviving life tenant, distribution of the remaining corpus was
to go to the then living grandchildren of Margaret Jewett and to
the then living issue of any deceased grandchild, per stirpes.55
In 1972, petitioner's mother, the sole remaining life beneficiary
of the trust, was still living. During that year, petitioner executed
unequivocable disclaimers of his interest in the trust,5 6 valid under

the applicable Massachusetts law. The Commissioner assessed a
tax deficiency of approximately $750,000 against petitioner, who
filed an action in the Tax Court to recover the assessment. The Tax
Court unanimously held that petitioner's disclaimer, made twentyfour years after he reached majority and thirty-three years after
creation of his interest, although before the interest indefeasibly
vested, was invalid for gift tax purposes. The Tax Court determined that the disclaimer had not been made within a reasonable
time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer, as required by
setion 25.2511-1(c). The court accordingly ruled that petitioner's
disclaimers were taxable gifts under sections 2501(a) and 2511(a)
57
of the Internal Revenue Code.
51. 638 F.2d at 95.
52. Id. at 95.
53. The Eighth Circuit had twice previously ruled directly contrary to the Ninth Circuit's
Jewett holding. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
54. 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
55. 70 T.C. 430, 431 (1978).
56. Petitioner actually exercised two separate disclaimers. In the first he renounced 95%
of his share, in the second, the remaining 5%. Id. at 431-32.
57. Id. at 438. The Tax Court relied on its decision in Keinath v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.
352, rev'd, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973). The Keinath tax court relied in turn on Fuller v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 147 (1961), as controlling precedent. In Fuller,the taxpayer received
the income from five-eighths of her husband's testamentary trust for many years before she
disclaimed. The court refused to allow the disclaimer, because the taxpayer had already
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The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Jewett did not disclaim within a reasonable time after knowledge of his grandmother's transfer to him of an interest in the trust estate. 58 On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
59
Circuit decision.
The Supreme Court Decision: A Closer Look
The only issue before the Court was the determination of the
time at which a transfer would be deemed to occur for federal gift
tax purposes. Does the transfer occur when the interest is created,
as the government contended, or, at a later time, when the interest
either vests or becomes possessory, as petitioner contended? 60 The
Court held that for federal tax purposes, the transfer occurs at the
creation of the interest and that Jewett's attempted disclaimers
61
were therefore taxable transfers.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, first analyzed
the statutory provisions which are interpreted by the treasury
regulation. The Court noted that the Internal Revenue Code taxes
all gratuitous transfers of or interests in property, no matter how
direct or indirect. 62 In order to reach all such transfers, the gift tax
was enacted to complement the estate tax. The gift tax ensures
that property transferred inter viVos6 3 will not escape taxation
where, absent the inter vivos transfer, the property would have
been subject to the estate tax at the donor's death. The Court stated
that inasmuch as the effect of Jewett's disclaimer was to reduce
the size of his estate for estate tax purposes, the disclaimer should

accepted the benefits from the trust The Tax Court in Keinath read Fuller as resting upon the
taxpayer's acceptance of her interest in the trust, rather than upon her acceptance of the
beneficial income from the trust.
Although Keinath was reversed by the Eighth Circuit, the Tax Court persisted in its
reliance both on Fuller'sreasoning and result. See Cottrell v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 489,492
(1979), rev'd, 628 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1980); Jewett v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 430, 433 (1978),
aff'd, 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1082 (1982). Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Jewett finds the Fuller case easily distinguishable on its facts because Jewett never
accepted any portion of the trust benefits. Unlike the disclaimer in Fuller,therefore, Jewett's
disclaimer was not a transfer of accepted proeprty. The dissent found Fullerto be inapposite
authority for the Tax Court's decision. Id. at 1091 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980), affg, 70 T.C. 430 (1978).
59. 102 S. Ct. 1082 (1982).

60.

Id. at 1084.

61. Id. at 1083.
62. Id. at 1086.
63. Gifts effective during the donor's lifetime are inter vivos. Gifts made effective after
the donor's death are testamentary. See I A. ScowT ON TRUSTS § 17 (1976).
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be taxed as a gift. In addition, the indirect gift to the natural
objects of his bounty which resulted from his disclaimer fell clearly
64
within the scope of the estate and gift tax scheme.
The Court next focused on the meaning of the word "transfer" as
used specifically in section 25.2511-1(c). Although laymen 65 construe "transfer" as a change in the beneficial ownership of existing
interests in property, the term is used throughout the gift tax
provisions to refer to any gratuitous passage of property. In
addition, the Court found that the lack of any reference in the
regulation to contingent or future interests supported its conclusion
that the relevant transfer occurred at the testator's death rather
than at the time when Jewett's interest vested. For these reasons,
the Court concluded that the "reasonable time" requirement of
section 25.2511(c) tolled when Jewett knew of the existence of the
transfer from his grandmother, not at the death of the life benefi66
ciary which preceded the vesting of his interest.
The dissent, 67 written by Justice Blackmun and joined by
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, emphasized that the federal gift
tax deals with the concrete transfer of property by gift. 68 A
contingent remainderman such as Jewett might never receive the
property. For example, such a remainderman could predecease the
life beneficiary. This possibility, combined with the monetary
impact of the estate and gift tax provisions, had prompted the
Commissioner to enact section 25.2511-1(c) which, in Blackmun's
view, recognized the common law disclaimer and exempted it from
the gift tax.69 Section 25.2511-1(c) also permitted a disclaimer for
gift tax purposes as long as the disclaimer was valid under local
law and made within a reasonable time after knowledge of the
existence of the transfer. The reasonable time, nowhere defined in
the Code, was to be determined by the Commissioner, according to
70
justice and fairness under all the circumstances.
In Blackmun's opinion, the statutory transfer occurred at the
death of the life beneficiary, when the property interest passed

64. 102 S. Ct. at 1086-87.
65. Id. at 1087.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1091 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. Although not cited by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court has previously
articulated this proposition. See, e.g., Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930).
69. 102 S. Ct. at 1091 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
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indefeasibly to Jewett. 71 Jewett disclaimed before that transfer
occurred and thus before his property interest was fixed in quality
and quantity. Moreover, he never received any benefit from the
trust. The disclaimer, therefore, was made within a reasonable
time and should have been exempt from federal gift tax.72
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

The Court asserted two theories to support its position that the
transfer in the regulation refers to the original transfer from the
decedent who created the various interests rather than the transfer
of the property upon the death of the life tenant. Each of these
theories will be addressed.
The Court first asserted that the basic term "transfer" as used
throughout the Tax Code refers to any passage of property. The
Court stated that the "lack of any reference in the regulation to
future interests or contingent remainders, and the consistent focus
on transfers effected by the decedent by will or through the laws of
intestate distribution, undermines the suggestion that the relevant
'73
transfer occurs other than at the time of the testator's death.
By thus interpreting the regulation, the Court ignored a more
plausible reason for the regulation's linguistic emphases. The Code
envisions taxation on passage of control over property. 74 . Intestate
property passes to a decedent's heirs immediately at the decedent's
death. Transfers effected by a will, as a general rule, pass control
of the bulk of property at the distribution of the estate. Future
interests and contingent remainders, on the other hand, embody
passage which is indefinite and contingent, not immediate and
definite. Such interests were therefore not the concern of the regu75
lation's drafter.
Moreover, the breadth of the word "transfer" supports petitioner's position. Although some authorities define the essence of a

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1087.
74. Id. at 1093 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176,
181 (1943); Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39,43 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S.
280, 287 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930); cf. Commissioner v. Estate of
Vease, 314 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir. 1963). See generally Holzman, supra note 17; Note, Gift in
Trust, supra note 14.
75. This inference is logical. If the drafters were primarily concerned with the passage of
control over property, see supra note 74 and accompanying text, they were not as concerned
with events preceding that which passed control over property.
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transfer broadly as "the creating of rights in another," 76 others
define it as the passage of control over economic benefits of prop77
erty, rather than any technical change in title.
In addition, whether transfers are subject to an estate or gift tax
depends on the terms of the statute imposing the tax, and only
transfers within the terms of the statute are subject to the tax. 7
Under different statutes, 79 a future contingent estate may be taxable out of the vested property interest which was transferred,8 0 or
the estate may not be taxable until actual possession of the
81
property.
The only clear statement which can be made about the term
"transfer" in the regulation is that it does not necessarily mean
what either of the parties in Jewett had suggested. The language of
the statute on its face is far from clear, and the Court's perfunctory
analysis provides little clarification.
The Court's second theory suggested that the knowledge requirement of the regulation implies that the transfer occurred at the
creation of the interest. The Court explained that anyone to whom
assets have been distributed would know about the transfer and
that the language must therefore have been "drafted to protect
82
persons who had no knowledge of the creation of an interest."
This conclusory interpretation is easily refuted. There may well be
instances where an individual does not know that assets have
vested in him. For example, lost beneficiaries are somewhat common, particularly where a trust was created long before the vesting
of an interest. Section 25.2511-1(c) should protect such an individual. Proper interpretation of the regulation permits the reasonable
time requirement for a disclaimer to toll when the disclaimant
learns about the transfer. The Court's assertion thus fails to
account for alternate feasible analyses.
Strictly speaking, the Court's holding that the reasonable time is
tolled at the creation of the contingent interest is justifiable. The

76. See, e.g., Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Hoey, 117 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1941).
77. See, e.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39,43 (1939).
78. Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234,237(7th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 20-21. See
also In re Cohen's Estate, 270 N.Y. 383, 386, 1 N.E.2d 474, 475 (1936); In re Lowry's Estate,
314 Pa. 518,521,171 A. 878,879 (1934).
79. See supra note 20 for the various state provisions.
80. See, e.g., Matter of Vanderbilt's Estate, 172 N.Y. 69, 72, 64 N.E. 782, 783 (1902)
(construing the Transfer Tax Law, L 1896, ch. 908, § 230, as amended L. 1899, ch. 76).
81. See, e.g., In re Straus' Estate, 307 Pa. 454,458, 161 A. 547, 548 (1932) (construing the
Transfer Inheritance Tax Act of June 20,1916, P.L 521).
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1087.
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gift tax statute taxes the transfer of property by gift.83 The interpretive regulation states that the definition of the gift encompasses
"transactions whereby property or property rights or interests are
gratuitously passed." 84 Therefore, when the regulation permits
disclaimers "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the
existence of the transfer,"8 5 the referenced transfer could well be
the transfer from the initial act giving Jewett a contingent
remainder. The language of the statute, however, is too broad to be
interpreted without the regulations, and the regulations themselves are too ambiguous to be useful absent an understanding of
legislative history and judicial interpretation.
Because the plain text of the regulation is not clear as to the
meaning of the word transfer, it is appropriate to search the legislative history for the regulation's proper interpretation. 86 The
Court gave insufficient weight to this consideration and dismissed
all of the petitioner's arguments on that subject.8 7 The balance of
this article will focus on the three major areas of legislative history
underlying the regulation. Discussion will then return to the
appropriate interpretation of "transfer" for section 25.2511-1(c)
purposes to determine whether the Court properly taxed Jewett's
disclaimer.
Estate and Gift Taxes: In Pari Materia
In Jewett v. Commissioner, the Court observed that Jewett
waited until he was in his mid-40's, when he could determine
whether he would need the property himself, before attempting to
disclaim. 8 The Court asserted that "since the practical effect of
petitioner's disclaimer was to reduce the size of the taxable estate
and to confer a gratuitous benefit upon the natural objects of his
bounty, the treatment of the disclaimers as taxable gifts is fully
89
consistent with the basic purpose of the statutory scheme."
The Court apparently agreed with the Commissioner in princi83. I.R.C. § 2501 (1976).
84. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958) (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 1087.
87. Id. at 1088-89.
88. Id. at 1090-91. The Court's decision is probably best explained as a reaction against
the use of disclaimers as a tax planning device. However, the reason for the disclaimer is
irrelevant if it is valid under local law. See supra note 16.
Several commentators recognize that the most important use of the disclaimer is as a tax
planning device. See, e.g., Berall, supra note 16, at 92; Report, supra note 17, at 209.
89. 102 S. Ct. at 1086.
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pie that any transfer which has the appearance of an estate plannig device should be reachable by either the estate tax or the gift
tax.90 This principle is consonant with the overall gift and estate
tax statutory scheme, as previously announced by the Court. 91 The
scheme was designed to tax inter vivos gifts of property which
92
otherwise would be subject to estate taxes at the donor's death.
The gift tax is thus a corollary to the estate tax, and the two are to
93
be construed in pari materia.
Treatment of the disclaimer as a taxable gift is consistent with
the basic purpose of the statutory scheme, which is to tax tranfers
of whatever type. 94 But the drafters of section 25.2511-1(c) specifically permitted certain disclaimers to be exempt from the transfer
tax.95 Because a regulation must be interpreted to "harmonize
with and further and not to conflict with the objective of the statute
it implements," 9 6 the theory behind the taxes and the disclaimer
must be understood. Such an understanding reveals that no inconsistency inheres in the concept of a disclaimer exemption to the gift
tax.
Estate and gift taxes are imposed on the gratuitous transfer of
control over the economic benefit of property.9 7 Thus, construing
the two taxes in pari materiaeffects the individual purpose of each
of the taxes. For example, one who gives an inter vivos gift must
pay a gift tax because control of the property passes from the
donor to a donee. Once the property is given, and out of the control

90. Id.
91. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
92. Id. at 44. See also H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S.REP. No. 655, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932), which stated that the gift tax was designed to reach "those gifts
which are not reached for one reason or another by the estate tax." For a general introduction to estate and gift taxes, see Lowndes, Introductionto FederalEstate and Gift Taxes, 44
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lowndes].
93. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943); Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
39,44 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280,286 (1933). See generallyLowndes, supra
note 92; Common Sense Correlation,supra note 17.
94. I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2511 (1976).
95. The Gift Tax imposes a tax on all gratuitous transfers of property, "except as otherwise provided." I.R.C. § 2501 (1976). The treasury regulations permit certain exceptions,
including disclaimers which meet the specified requirements. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)
(1958). See supra notes 12-13, 35-37 and accompanying text.
96. Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. United States, 618 F.2d 736, 739 (Ct. Cl. 1980). See also
Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir. 1977).
97. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner,
308 U.S. 39,43 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280,287 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281
U.S. 376, 378 (1930). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Vease, 314 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir.
1963). See generally Holzman, supra note 17; Note, Gift in Trust, supra note 14.
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of the donor's estate, the estate can not be taxed on it at the donor's
death. 98 Conversely, if the donor transfers the property through a
testamentary gift, his estate will be taxed on the transfer of that
property at his death because the property remained within his
control at his death. The estate tax is imposed on the transfer from
the decedent to the beneficiary of all the taxable property over
which the decedent had control or in which he had retained an
interest at his death.99
A disclaimer, on the other hand, can only occur where the donee
has refused to accept the gift. 1°° As a result of the disclaimer, the
disclaimant never obtains the property, and it is treated as though
the beneficial interest had never vested in him. 10 1 The property
passes according to the terms of the instrument creating the interest, as it would if the disclaimant predeceased the grantor. 10 2 It
follows that the disclaimant has no power to direct the disposition
of the property he has disclaimed.
The essential difference between the estate and gift tax scheme
and the disclaimer, then, is the nature of the right which is exercised. The taxes are imposed on the donor who has power and
control over the subject property. This power and control passes at
the direction of the donor, or, in cases of intestacy, at the direction
of the state, to some designated beneficiary. A disclaimer, on the
other hand, is the complete and unqualified refusal of the disclaimant to accept a gift and some or all of the rights of ownership to
which that gift otherwise entitles him. As a result of the disclaimer, the property passes to whomever is next in line according to the
direction of the donor. This latter beneficiary then receives the
control and power formerly held by the donor. The disclaimant
receives no rights in the property and the transfer is deemed to be
between the donor and the ultimate beneficiary.
Because the estate and gift tax scheme envisions imposition of a
tax on transfers which effect a change in control over property,
98. A transfer made within three years of the donor's death is considered "made in
contemplation of death," and thus is subject to the federal estate tax under I.R.C. § 2035
(1976).
In addition, powers of appointment are notable exceptions to this general rule. See I.R.C.
2036, 2038 (1976). Discussion of powers of appointment, however, are beyond the scope of

this article.
99. I.R.C. § 2001 (1976). See also Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283 (1933).
100. Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683, 693 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919
(1972). See also cases cited supra note 15.
101. 1022 S. Ct. at 1093 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally I A. SCOTT ON TRUSTS
§ 36.1 (1967 ed.).
102. Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 60 (8th Cir. 1973).
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exempting the indirect transfer by a disclaimant' 0 3 from the
transfer tax is fully consistent with the statutory scheme. 10 4 In
fact, treatment of a disclaimer as a taxable gift, as applied by the
Court in Jewett, is itself inconsistent with the thrust of the tax
scheme.
For example, if a contingent remainderman predeceases a life
beneficiary, it is well settled that the property subject to the contingent remainder is not "property" includable in the remainderman's gross estate. 10 5 Thus, if Jewett had predeceased his mother,
his contingent interest in the trust property would neither have
come into his estate, nor have been subject to the estate tax.
Similarly, the trust property never comes into the estate of a
disclaimant. Jewett disclaimed before accepting the benefits of the
property and before exercising any control over it. By disclaiming,
Jewett removed himself from the line of beneficiaries, and all the
10 6
rights of ownership passed around him, not through him.
The disclaimer therefore should not be subject to a gift tax. In
both situations, i.e., disclaimer or death of a contingent remainderman, the property passes to others according to the terms of the
donor's will, without having been subject to the contingent
remainderman/disclaimant's control. The effect of either event on
the passage of the property is substantially the same. Yet the
Court's position in Jewett would create disparate tax consequences. The Court would tax the one situation (disclaimer) but not
the other (donee's death).
There is no theoretical justification for the Court's action in this
regard. Its assertion that the estate and gift taxes are to be read in
pari materia, while correct, does not negate the exception for disclaimers intended by the drafters and manifested in section
25.2511-1(c). This intent is patently obvious in the legislative history of the regulation.
103. The transfer is indirect because, but for the disclaimer, the resultant beneficiary
would not have received the subject property.
104. See generally Berall, supra note 16; Holzman, supra note 17; Kay, supra note 21;
Lowndes, supra note 92; Report, supra note 17. The Court held the opposite, that "treatment
of the disclaimers as taxable gifts is fully consistent with the basic purpose of the statutory
scheme." 102 S. Ct. at 1087. For support of this position, see generally Kay, supra note 21;
Martin, supra note 14; Note, Federal Gift Tax, supra note 44.
105. Estate of Williams v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 400,410 (1974). See also Lee v. United
States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,128 (S.D. Tex. 1962). Conversely, a vested remainder
interest not subject to divestiture is considered "property" includable in a remainderman's
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. McGinnes, 324
F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1963). See also Armstrong v. Grandin, 39 Ohio St. 368, 373 (1883).
106. 102 S. Ct. at 1093 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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OriginalDraft versus FinalRegulation

The original draft of the regulation, published on January 3,
1957,107 provided in pertinent part:
The renunciation of a vested property interest [of one] in
whom title immediately vests upon a decedent's death constitutes a gift to those persons who receive the property
interest by means of the renunciation. On the other hand,
the renunciation of a gift, if under local law title does not
immediately vest, is not a gift if the renunciation is made
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of
10 8
the interest.
The final version of the regulation, published on November 15,
1958,109 provided in pertinent part:
(c)... Where the law governing the administration of the
decedent's estate gives a beneficiary a right to completely
and unqualifiedly refuse to accept ownership of property
transferred from a decedent, a refusal to accept ownership
does not constitute the making of a gift if the refusal is
made within a reasonable time after knowledge of the
existence of the transfer. 11 0
Purporting to follow the intent of the drafters,'1 1 the Court
asserted that the change from "interest" in the original draft to
"transfer" in the final regulation was made to properly distinguish
between Brown v. Routzahn"1 2 and Hardenbergh v. Commis-

107. 22 Fed. Reg. 58 (1957).
108. Id. The full text provides:
The renunciation of a vested property interest, such as the interest of an heir or
next-of-kin, or devisee in whom title immediately vests upon a decedent's death
under local law, constitutes a gift to those persons who receive the property interest by means of the renunciation. On the other hand the renunciation of a gift,
bequest, or inheritance, if under local law title does not immediately vest, is not a
gift if the renunciation is complete, and is made within a reasonable time after
knowledge of the existence of the interest. The renunciation must be unequivocal
and effective under local law. A renunciation is a complete and unqualified refusal
to accept the property to which one is entitled. There can be no renunciation of
property after its acceptance....
109. 23 Fed. Reg. 8910 (1958).
110. Id. The full text of the final draft, now embodied as Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958),
is provided supra note 12.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 1088. See also Memorandum from Internal Revenue Commissioner to
Secretary of the Treasury (Oct. 1, 1958), published in XIII TAX NOTES 203 (July 27, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Memo to Secretary]; infra text accompanying notes 117-18; T.D. 6334,
1958-2 C.B. 627.
112. 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
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sioner,"3 the two cases the regulation was intended to codify.' 1 4

The original draft emphasized the distinction as one of contingent
as opposed to vested interests. The Commissioner ultimately
determined, however, that the real difference rested in the validity
of the disclaimer under the local law of the two jurisdictions.' 15 The
language at the beginning of the regulation thus was changed to
reflect the Commissioner's distinction, and the language at the end
was altered to achieve parallel structure with the substituted language at the beginning.
The Court asserted that the Commissioner did not intend, as
Jewett contended, to change the timing of the taxable event.
Rather, consonant with the estate and gift tax scheme, the taxable
event occurred at the time of the transfer of property interests from
the decedent." 6 This construction enabled the Court to interpret
the language "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the
existence of the transfer" as though the words "from the decedent"
were appended.
The Court's construction is visibly flawed. There is no logical
connection between the change in the regulation which reflected
the Commissioner's understanding of the proper distinction
between Brown and Hardenbergh,and the change in regulatory
language from "interest" to "transfer." The proper distinction
between these cases, as reflected by a memorandum from the
Commissioner to the Secretary of the Treasury which accompanied his final draft of the regulation, 17 and accurately noted by the
Court, turned on whether state law permits disclaimers."8 , The
tolling point for measurement of the reasonable time, whether
from creation of the interest or from the transfer, was unrelated to
the issue of legality under state law. Thus, this construction cannot
aid in construing the intent of the drafters respecting the specific
change in language from "interest" to "transfer."
The only material generated by the IRS explaining the language
change between the draft and the final versions was a list of criticisms of the proposed regulations from the Office of Chief Counsel
113. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
114. Memo to Secretary, supra note 111. The Court's assertion regarding Brown and
Hardenberghwas made in response to petitioner's argument. See infra text accompanying
notes 123-30.
115. Memo to Secretary, supra note 111.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 1088.
117. Memo to Secretary, supra note 111.
118. Id., which states in relevant part: "The proper distinction between the two cases
turns on the question of whether under the applicable state law a beneficiary or heir can or
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of the IRS. This list stated, inter alia, that "the renunciation rule
should not depend on testacy v. intestacy."'1 9 Thus, the thrust of
the change in language from "interest" to "transfer" in section
25.2511-1(c), given so much weight by both the government and
petitioner in Jewett, was frankly not the focus of the drafters.
Comparison of the actual language of the respective regulations
may illuminate the intent of the drafters. The word "interest" in
the original version encompassed both contingent and vested
interests. Had the final regulation retained the "interest" language, Jewett's disclaimer would be taxable because he knew of
his contingent interest thirty-three years prior to his disclaimer.
Thirty-three years certainly violates any "reasonable time"
requirement.
In contrast, the word "transfer" may suggest a narrower concept, namely, a change in control or benefit of property. Control of
the property never passed to Jewett; thus his disclaimer could not
be a transfer. This construction of the regulation does not require
that Jewett be taxed on his disclaimer, because he still had not
received a transfer of property. This construction is consistent with
the overall scheme of the estate and gift taxes, as interpreted by
the courts since the regulation was promulgated. 120
Such a construction comports with the intent of the drafters to
maintain then current law, as manifested by a Technical Memorandum' 21 issued by the Commissioner's Technical Planning Division. This memorandum clearly indicated that the IRS followed
Brown before 1958, and intended to codify Brown in section
25.2511-1(c).

122

cannot refuse to accept ownership of the property which passed from the decedent...." The
Ohio statute permitted the disclaimer in Brown, 63 F.2d at 916, but Minnesota intestacy law
did not permit the disclaimer in Hardenburgh,198 F.2d at 67.
119. Halbach Amicus Brief at app. 11, Jewett v. Commissioner, 102 S. Ct 1082 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Halbach brief].
120. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
121. A technical memorandum is a form of legislative history with respect to a treasury
regulaton, often citing the reasons for a regulatoin, which constitutes the working law of the
IRS. See Taxation with Representation Fund v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
122. Technical Memorandum from the Director, Technical Planning Division, to the
Director, Special Technical Services Division of the Internal Revenue Service (written sometime between May 25, 1956 and October 11, 1957) [hereinafter cited as Tech. Memo]. For the
text of this Tech. Memo, see Halbach brief, supra note 119, at app. 9. The Halbach estate
asserted its interest in this case as an amicus because it was litigating the same issue with
the Commissioner. The bulk of the amicus brief discussed technical material obtained from
the Commissioner pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. The government took
over one year to respond to the request and then did so only as a result of litigation.
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The Technical Memorandum was issued pursuant to receipt of a
so-called "Proposed Ruling" 123 by the Director of the Technical
Planning Division some time in 1956. The proposed ruling specifically provided, inter alia,that a renunciation of an inheritance or
legacy under a will constituted a taxable "transfer" for gift tax
purposes, regardless of property law title considerations. 124 Upon
receipt of this proposed raling, the Technical Planning Division
recommended the proposed ruling be withheld. The Director explained
that the IRS had previously followed Brown and Hardenbergh,
and that adoption of the proposed ruling would change the position of the IRS in this regard. Although such a change had been
contemplated by the drafters, the Director explained, such a
change in position might prompt Congress to pass legislation
ordering that all disclaimers be exempt from the gift tax.1 25 It was
therefore determined that "the prior position of the Service with
respect to cases coming within the Brown v. Routzahn decision
26
should not be changed."'
The Technical Memorandum emphasized that the distinction
between Brown and Hardenberghnarrowly turned on whether a
disclaimer could be made under applicable state law.1 27 This distinction was intended to be preserved under the regulation. In
addition, however, the Technical Planning Division Director indicated that not only the distinctions, but the broader rulings of the
decisions were to be retained. 28
The Ninth Circuit noted as recently as 1963 that the Brown
decision established that ". . . the federal tax on transfers . . . is
levied on the transfer of property, not on the exercise of a right to
renounce testamentary gifts."' 129 This position lends support to the
proposition that the difference in the plain meaning of the words
123. The internal procedure of the IRS provides that letters may be issued in response to
taxpayer requests for rulings on the consequences of a particular situation. These answers

are called Letter Rulings. If the Commissioner feels that a Letter Ruling is of general public
interest, he may publish it as a Revenue Ruling. When a ruling is ready to be issued prior to
the promulgation of pertinent pending regulations, it must be cleared by the Technical
Planning Division (author of the regulations) prior to release. The text of this proposed
ruling is found in Halbach brief, supra note 119, at app. 7.
124. Id.
125. E.g., disclaimers invalid under local law, such as those in Hardenbergh.See Tech.
Memo, supranote 122.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Commissioner v. Estate of Vease, 314 F.2d 79, 88 (9th Cir. 1963). Seventeen years
later, the Ninth Circuit taxed Jewett's disclaimer, 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied,
Feb. 18, 1981.
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"transfer" and "interest" suggests the drafters' intent to tax only
the former. 130 If so, the Court's holding in Jewett disregards the
intent of the drafters of section 25.2511-1(c) and the decision in
Brown, which the regulation was intended to codify.
The Significance of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
As further justification for its decision, the Court asserted that
I.R.C. § 2518, entitled "Disclaimers" and added to the Code by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976,131 sheds no light on the interpretation of
section 25.2511-1(c). 13 2 The Court insisted, therefore, that its decision in Jewett was based soley on section 25.2511-1(c) without
reference to section 2518.133 By taking this stance, the Court
ignored the congressional understanding of section 25.2511-1(c)
which is elucidated in the legislative history to section 2518.
In its discussion of the proposed section 2518, the House Ways
and Means Committee Report 13 4 first noted that under section
25.2511-1(c), a disclaimer must comply with local law in order to be

130. See supra text accompanying note 120.
131. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added section 2518 to the Internal Revenue Code. This
section provides that a qualified disclaimer is "an irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a
person to accept an interest in property" and lists four requisites of a qualified disclaimer.
I.R.C. § 2518 (1976). See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. Several law review
articles were written about the proposed interpretive Treas. Reg. § 25.2518. See, e.g., Donovan and Reid, supra note 17; Frimmer, Proposed Regs Under Section 2518 Explain and
Expand the Federal Disclaimer Statute, 53 J. TAX'N 266 (1980); Martin, supra note 14;
Wenig, supra note 17; Note, ProposedDisclaimerRegulations Concentrateon Meshing with
State Law, 53 J. TAX'N 243 (1980). See generally 34A Am. JUR. 2D Disclaimers
47, 325 47,339 (1981). There was considerable discontent with the 1976 Act, however, and Congress
returned to the drawing boards. The result was the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA). ERTA apparently buttresses some of the adverse impact of the Tax Reform Act of
1976. ERTA provides that "certain transfers" will be treated as disclaimers. Thus, even
absent the fulfillment of the requirements for an effective disclaimer under the 1976 Act, the
transfer of a transferor's entire interest in property to one who would have received it if there
had been a disclaimer will be treated as a valid disclaimer for federal transfer tax purposes.
Such a transfer, however, must be timely made and the transferor may not have accepted
any of the transfer's benefits. Local law will be applicable to determine the identity of the
transferee, but the transfer need not satisfy the local disclaimer requirements. Moreover, the
disclaimant's direction of the transfer is not an acceptance. H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong.,
1st Seas. 191 (1981). See generally How to Disclaim After ERTA 81, 1 ESTATE PLANNING
IDEAS § 1 (1982).
The general purpose of ERTA, however, was to provide the uniformity in disclaimer law
which the 1976 Act did not achieve. See generally 3 FED. EST. & GIwr TAX REP. (CCH)
12,445 (1981).
132. 102 S. Ct. at 1090.
133. Id.
134. H.R. REP. No. 1380,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-68, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3356, 3419-22.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

valid for gift tax purposes.1 35 The report cited Keinath v. Commissioner 3 6 as indicative of the proper interpretation of section
25.2511-1(c). It noted, however, that under the 1954 Code, the
Keinath situation might prompt a different result in different
37
jurisdictions, depending upon applicable local law.
Because the tax consequences under section 25.2511-1(c) varied
according to local law, the House report stated that the new section
2518 was intended to provide a uniform standard within which to
evaluate the timeliness of a disclaimer for federal tax purposes. 138 The statute specifically applies to "transfers creating an
39
interest in the person disclaiming made after December 31, 1976."'
As to all transfers made prior to January 1, 1977, "the rules relating to disclaimers under [the then] present law, including the
period within which a disclaimer must be made, are to continue to
apply to disclaimers made after December 31, 1976"140
The Supreme Court correctly asserted in Jewett that new laws
do not necessarily change prior law.' 4 ' But as the dissent points
out,1 42 it is anomalous for the Court to state that the above legislative history for section 2518 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 casts no
light on the proper interpretation of section 25.2511-1(c). On the
contrary, the legislative history suggested that the Keinath decision properly reflected the law under section 25.2511-1(c), expressed
congressional dissatisfaction with the law so written, and stated
Congress' further intent to change that law prospectively. 43 The
Court's interpretation of section 25.5211(c) in Jewett thus disregarded congressional interpretation of that regulation.
THE MEANING OF TRANSFER: A MATTER OF POLICY
The most important concept in estate planning, undermined by
Jewett, is certainty in the tax laws. 44 Certainty is critical, and, as

135. Id. at 66, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3420. See also Frimmer,
Using Disclaimersin Post Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues,
48 J. TAx'N 322,323 (1978).
136. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
137. H.R. REP. No. 1380,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3356, 3420.
138. Id. at 67, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3421.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 68, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3422.
141. 102 S. Ct. at 1090 (citing Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361,367 (1960)).
142. 102 S. Ct. at 1094. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 17, at 673.
144. Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U.S. 54, 56 (1939); Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d

19821

Jewett v. Commissioner

a general rule, tax statutes are therefore interpreted consistently. 145
Congress recognized the need for consistency when it incorporated
section 7805 into the Revenue Code. 146 Section 7805 gives the
Secretary of the Treasury discretion to prescribe the extent to
47
which rules and regulations are to be given retroactive effect.
The courts have curbed this discretion, however, and imposed a
duty on the IRS to avoid inequitable results. 48 Exercise of the
Secretary's discretion towards that end includes considering the
"totality of the circumstances surrounding the handing down of a
49
ruling."1
In the ill-fated proposed ruling, sent to the Technical Planning
Division for approval pending promulgation of the final section
25.2511-1(c), 50 the IRS explicitly stated that "under the authority
contained in section 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
the ruling set forth herein will not be applied retroactively with
respect to such renunciation which became absolute and irrevocable prior to the date of this bulletin."' 5 1 The proposed ruling
would have changed the interpretation of section 25.2511-1(c) as
drastically as the Court changed it in Jewett.
The proposed ruling was never issued, because the regulation
which was issued retained rather than changed the law. 52 But the
Commission's use of section 7805 to change the interpretation of
section 25.2511-1(c) indicated the Commissioner's awareness that
the ruling represented a change from prior law, and that such a
change must be prospective in application in order to avoid
unfairness. 5 3 In fact, when the disclaimer law was'congression155
ally codified in 1976,154 the change was made prospective only,
1127 (8th Cir. 1980); Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 61 (8th Cir. 1973); Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), afrd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
940 (1971). But see Bromberg, Equalization Clauses and Untimely Disclaimers,TR.& EST..
June, 1981, at 64, 65 [hereinafter cited as Bromberg).
145. See Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U.S. 54, 56 (1939). See also Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 1980).
146. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1976).
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957).

149. International Business Mach. v. United States, 343 F2d 914,920 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
151. See Halbach brietf supra note 119, at app. 7.
152. Tech. Memo, supra note 122.

153. See, eg., Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957).
154. I.RC. § 2518 (1976).
155.

H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65,67, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD.NEWS 3356,3421.
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in keeping with the spirit of section 7805.
In contrast to congressional consensus that consistency in the
tax laws is important, the Court's position in Jewett encouraged
the Commissioner to take inconsistent positions at the expense of
taxpayers. Although the Commissioner intended to retain then
current law when he promulgated section 25.2511-1(c) in 1958,156

he now seeks to change

it.157

In addition, the Commissioner has

expressly stated his refusal to follow appellate court decisions, 158
even though those decisions accurately reflect the intent of the
drafters and comport with previously accepted principles of law.
By permitting the Commissioner to change his interpretation of
the law midstream, the Court effectively treated the estate and gift
tax scheme as though it were the income tax scheme. Taxpayers
expect changes in income tax law. Therefore, they must determine
each year when they fill out their returns whether changes have
occurred since the previous year. Estate planning, on the other
hand, does not occur annually. Taxpayers must necessarily rely on
precedent. Courts strive to retain conformity in interpretation of
estate and gift tax laws. 159 Yet Jewett upheld a disharmonious
court of appeals decision and permitted the Commissioner to reinterpret his regulation.
The effects of this decision go beyond the $750,000 Jewett paid
on property he never received. Jewett allowed the Commission to
assess retroactively deficiencies on virtually all disclaimers ever
exercised which have previously been deemed effective. 160 The
Jewett decision thus propels taxpayers into confusion and compels
estate planners to work at their own peril.
The thrust of the Court's argument revolved around its expansive reading of the word "transfer." The Court (and the Commissioner) asserted that Jewett controlled the disposition of the property by retaining the right to disclaim for thirty-three years. 61
156. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Halbach v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 141 (1978); Jewett v. Commissioner, 70
T.C. 430 (1978), af'd, 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980); Keinath v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 352,
rev'd, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973).
158. See Ltr. Rul. 7806080 (Nov. 14,1977) in which the IRS expressly stated that it would
not follow the Keinath decision to dispose of cases outside of the Eighth Circuit. See also
Bromberg, supra note 144, at 65.
159. See Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir. 1980).
160. Disclaimers do not result in taxable gifts. Therefore, disclaimants may not have
filed gift tax returns on the property disclaimed. The statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the gift tax return is filed. Thus, property disclaimed at any earlier time could not
be assessed if no gift tax return had been filed.
161. 102 S. Ct. at 1089 (quoting Jewett v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 430, 438 (1978)). This is
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Gratuitous relinquishment of such control constituted a transfer

subject to the gift taxes.
Broadly speaking, this analysis is correct. 6 2 All disclaimers are
technically indirect transfers of control because, by refusing to
accept, the disclaimant permits someone else to take. But the
Commission itself narrowed this expansive concept of control with
regard to disclaimers when it promulgated section 25.2511-1(c).
There it recognized that a disclaimer does not constitute relinquishment of control, because the disclaimer is exercised before
control over the property itself ever takes effect. 63 Thus, the reasonable time governing the effectiveness of the disclaimer should
have been measured from the transfer which occurred at the death
of the life beneficiary. Instead, the court measured that time period
from the death of the testator, in order to tax the transfer with
which the Court was really concerned: that flowing from the
disclaimant.
When the Commissioner determined that Jewett's disclaimer
was a taxable gift, he did so because the disclaimer had the effect
of decreasing Jewett's taxable estate. 6 4 The Commissioner should
have been precluded from doing this by his own regulation, which
recognized a disclaimer if certain requirements were met. 165
Jewett had met those requirements. The subsequent refusal of the
Supreme Court at this juncture to permit Jewett's disclaimer disregards the drafters' intent and congressional understanding of
Treasury Regulation section 25.2511-1(c).
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should never have granted certiorari in
Jewett v. Commissioner.1 66 The perceived conflict had already
been resolved, albeit prospectively, by the passage of section 2518
only true, indirectly, of course. The disclaimed property passes according to the terms of the
instrument which created the interest. In Jewett's case, the disclaimed property passed to
the natural objects of his bounty. See supra text accompanying note 19. But this was due to
the intent of the original donor, not necessarily Jewett's intent.
162. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
163. See Berall, supra note 16, at 92; Kay, supra note 21, at 767; Report, supra note 17, at
209; Note, Estate PlanningDevice, supra note 17, at 567.
164. 102 S. Ct. at 1094.
165. There is a strong presumption that the Treasury Regulations are valid, especially
when they are issued pursuant to specific legislative authority. United Telecommunications,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 589 F.2d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
The Commission's new interpretation of the regulation is contrary to its prior intent, and
may therefore be invalid as a violation of the taxpayer's due process. Pursuit of this suggestion, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
166. 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
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of the Internal Revenue Code. Although the Ninth Circuit created
a conflict among the circuits, 16 7 the conflict could have resolved
itself either by an en banc reversal or by the failure of any other
court to follow Jewett's improper result.
Alternatively, the conflict could have been permitted to stand.
The rule against perpetuities 16 8 ensures that instruments creating future interests must vest in the last beneficiary within twentyone years after the death of a life in being at the time such instrument was created. Thus, with the passage of time, the problem
which arose in Jewett would cease to arise.
Having taken the case, the Court disregarded legislative history
and judicial precedent. The Court failed to appreciate the importance of stability in the gift tax area, as well as the significance of
the broader tax scheme. Consequently, after Jewett, only two
avenues remain for taxpayers with property interests created by
an instrument prior to January 1, 1977. A taxpayer may either
avoid disclaiming altogether, since it is obvious the Commissioner
intends to assess a tax on such disclaimers, or a taxpayer may
hope that Congress will legislatively reverse the Court's decision
by passing legislation which will clarify the confusion engendered
by Jewett v. Commissioner.69
FRANCES S. GLUSHAKOW-SMITH

167. CompareJewett v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980) with Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1980) and Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir.
1973).
168. Discussion of the rule against perpetuities is beyond the scope of this article. For
an excellent general explanation of the operation of the rule, see Leach, Perpetuities:The
Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REv. 973 (1965); Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 5 HARv. L.
REv. 638 (1938).
169. Perhaps in anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision, Senators Symms and
Wallop introduced a bill in the United States Senate on November 30, 1981. The bill permitted disclaimers of an interest in property created by transfers made prior to November 14,

1958 (the date the regulation was promulgated) if the disclaimer was made within nine
months following enactment of the bill, or within nine months following the disclaimant's
knowledge of his interest (but no later than December 31, 1991). S. 1983,97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Dec. 16, 1981). The hearing on the bill by the Estate and Gift Tax Subcommittee of the
Senate Finance Committee was held on May 27, 1982.
One possibility which always remains, of course, is that the Court will reverse itself in
some subsequent case. It has done so before. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).

